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Abstract
Co‐payments for long‐term care (LTC) can impose a
substantial financial burden on the elderly. How this
burden is distributed across income groups depends on
the design of the co‐payment. We estimate the lifecycle
dynamics of LTC using Dutch administrative data.
These estimates are inputs in a stochastic lifecycle
decision model. Using the model, we analyze the
welfare effects of the Dutch income‐ and wealth‐
dependent co‐payment system and compare it to al-
ternative systems. We find that the Dutch co‐payment
system redistributes income to low‐income groups,
who use the most care over their life but contribute the
least co‐payments, from high‐income groups, who pay
the most. Moreover, the Dutch system protects the
middle‐income groups relatively well against financial
risk: although alternative co‐payment systems hardly
affect these groups average payments, they induce
welfare losses of 2% to 4% due to an increased risk of
very high co‐payments.
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1 | INTRODUCTION
Confronted with an aging population, policy makers around the world are seeking to provide
adequate long‐term care (LTC) for the elderly, while simultaneously keeping public finances
sustainable (Colombo & Mercier, 2012). In designing LTC financing schemes they have to
balance the need to control public LTC spending and reduce suboptimal use of care through
out‐of‐pocket payments, and the need to protect the elderly from the substantial financial cost
that can come with prolonged dependence on care. The need for financial protection is espe-
cially important for lower‐income groups, as they not only have less means to self‐insure but
might also have a high risk of LTC use, due to poor health. To balance these needs, countries
with a public LTC insurance system have generally introduced co‐payments, based on a fixed
percentage of total LTC costs, or means‐testing, where individuals can only access public LTC
after depleting their own financial means. However, these co‐payment schemes can still expose
low‐ and middle‐income groups to considerable financial risk.
In this paper, we investigate how the design of the LTC co‐payment system affects the
financial burden across income and wealth groups. Although the impact of (a lack of) LTC
insurance on consumption, savings, and welfare has been investigated before (e.g., Ameriks
et al., 2020, 2011; De Nardi et al., 2016; Khwaja, 2010; Kopecky & Koreshkova, 2014;
Peijnenburg et al., 2017), the impact of the design of the co‐payment on the financial burden of
different income groups has not. We focus on LTC co‐payments in The Netherlands, which has
one of the most‐extensive social insurance systems for LTC in the world and where private LTC
insurance is absent. Users of LTC pay a co‐payment of which the annual maximum is based on
a share of the users income and wealth. Compared to most means‐based co‐payment systems in
other countries (see Colombo & Mercier, 2012 and Simmons et al., 2020, for an overview), the
Dutch system enables very specific fine‐tuning of the financial impact of co‐payments across
income and wealth groups. To assess the distributional impact of this scheme, we compare it to
two more common alternatives: a flat‐rate co‐payment, independent of a users financial means,
and a co‐payment that depends on income but not on financial wealth.
We make two specific contributions. First, we take a lifecycle perspective. This is crucial in
understanding the distribution of LTC costs across income groups, because these groups do not
only differ on average care needs at any given age, but also in (healthy) life expectancy. For
instance, a 70‐year old with a low income is on average less healthy, and thus more likely to use
LTC, than a 70‐year old with a high income. At the same time, a 70‐year old with a low income
has a lower life expectancy and thus a smaller chance of needing LTC at very old age.
The dynamics between income, health, and survival thus have to be modeled to fully assess
income difference in care costs. As complete data on an individuals LTC costs over the whole
lifecycle are not available, these lifecycle dynamics have to be modeled using (short) panel data
combining different observations. To do so, we apply a novel, semiparametric estimation
method developed by Wong et al. (2016) in the context of curative care.1
Second, we go beyond a descriptive analysis based on averages per income group and
include the welfare effects of the financial risk that co‐payments impose. The distribution of
LTC use is very skewed; the probability that an individual needs nursing‐home care over many
consecutive years is small, but when an individual does need it, the costs can be very high. It is
this small risk of very high costs that has the most important welfare impact, especially for
1
See Hussem et al. (2016), for a descriptive analysis of lifetime LTC costs in The Netherlands using the same approach.
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lower‐income groups, but this impact cannot be assessed by only looking at the average co‐
payments across groups (see, for instance, McClellan & Skinner, 2006 on the value of public‐
health insurance). The fact that it is often difficult or impossible to buy (additional) LTC
insurance on the private market makes assessing the welfare effects of incomplete insurance in
the public system particularly relevant (Brown & Finkelstein, 2009).
To estimate the full welfare effects of different co‐payment schemes, we develop a
stochastic lifecycle decision model for singles at retirement age, using our empirical esti-
mates on the dynamics in mortality and LTC use as inputs. This model determines optimal
consumption and saving behaviors of the elderly for different levels of initial wealth and
pensions at retirement, taking into account the distribution of LTC costs and mortality.
We use this model to analyze changes in welfare across income groups when going from the
current income‐ and wealth‐dependent co‐payment system to other, less fine‐tuned
systems.
We find that the Dutch income‐ and wealth‐dependent co‐payment system protects elderly
with low and middle incomes relatively well against LTC costs. Despite the fact that the average
lifetime use of LTC of the lowest income group is almost 30% higher than that of the highest
income group, their average annual co‐payments are considerably lower (600 vs. 1600 Euros
per year). Compared to the current system, the introduction of a flat‐rate co‐payment system
would lead to a considerable welfare loss (between 2% and 4%) for the low‐ and middle‐income
groups. This loss is largest for the elderly with a middle income: although their average co‐
payments would increase only slightly, they would be most severely affected by the loss in
protection against the risk of very high costs.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we provide a short description of the
Dutch LTC insurance system. In Section 3, we discuss the application of the nearest‐
neighbor algorithm on Dutch LTC data and describe the estimated lifecycle paths. In
Section 4, we introduce a lifecycle model for consumption and saving of retirees in case of
LTC co‐payments. We also explain the numerical approach that allows us to use the esti-
mated lifecycle paths in this model. In Section 5 we present our results, and in Section 6 we
discuss the implications of our findings and the main limitations of our approach. Section 7
concludes.
2 | THE DUTCH LONG ‐TERM CARE SYSTEM
The Netherlands has one of the most extensive collective LTC arrangements in the world
(Colombo & Mercier, 2012). In the period investigated (before 2015), social insurance, the
Exceptional Medical Expenses Act (AWBZ), covered a broad range of professional home‐care
services (social support, personal care, and nursing) and institutional care (nursing homes and
residential care).2 Care was generally provided in‐kind.3 The income‐dependent premium for
the AWBZ was collected through income tax (including pension income) in the first and second
income brackets.
2
In 2015, the LTC system was reformed. Nursing‐home care is still covered by a national social insurance (WLZ), but the provision of home care is now mainly
the responsibility of municipalities.
3
Individuals can also choose a personal care budget, which they can use to buy care themselves. This can also be used to pay informal care givers. We have no
microdata on this type of care provision, but the use of these personal budgets was limited within elderly care (Sadiraj et al., 2011)
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Given the extensive public arrangements for LTC, privately financed LTC services were as
good as absent,4 and there was no private insurance for LTC. Eligibility for LTC was de-
termined by an independent assessment agency based on needs (see Bakx et al., 2020).
Users of LTC paid a co‐payment. This basically functioned as a means‐dependent deduc-
tible: users pay the full costs of LTC, up to an annual maximum amount. This amount de-
pended on the financial means of the individual, and differed according to the type of care
(home or institutional care) and living situation. We explain the details of the co‐payment
scheme in Section 4.3.
3 | LTC SPENDING OVER THE LIFECYCLE
3.1 | Source data
We use administrative data on LTC use for the period 2008 to 2013 from the Dutch Central
Administrative Office (CAK). These include information on all publicly financed formal LTC
use in The Netherlands. They contain information on the type of care (institutional care,
nursing‐home care, personal home care, and support) and the amount of care used (in days for
institutional care, and in hours for home care). We derive costs of LTC from use in hours/days
in the CAK database and the tariffs provided by the Dutch Health Authority (NZA) for ex-
tramural care and derived from the CAK and Dutch Health Care Institute (CVZ) annual reports
for intramural care. We do not have information on use of privately financed LTC, which seems
to be limited in The Netherlands (Van Ooijen et al., 2018) due to the extensive public system.
The LTC data are linked to other datasets using a unique personal identification number.
The Dutch Municipal Register provides basic information on everyone within a municipality.
From this register, we obtain date of death, age, sex, and marital status. We use data from the
tax services to obtain gross income, net financial wealth, and net housing wealth.5
We select individuals alive up to January 1, 2013, who were 67 or older in 2013, and single
over the full observation period. These restrictions were imposed to keep the lifecycle model
tractable. We purge period effects from the data (see Appendix A.1, for the details).
3.2 | The nearest‐neighbor algorithm
We use a semiparametric model, the nearest‐neighbor resampling method, to estimate lifecycle
paths of mortality, LTC use, income and wealth representative of the Dutch elderly. Although
there are many specific implementations, the idea behind nearest‐neighbor matching (NNM) is
to match an observation from one group (for instance a treatment group) to the most similar
observation from another group (a control group). NNM uses a distance metric to determine,
based on the covariate values, which observation from the other group is the nearest. Some of
the first implementations of NNM in a time series or panel context are by Farmer and
Sidorowich (1987) and Hsieh (1991). We used the approach developed by Wong et al. (2016)
who use this method to estimate lifecycle paths of curative care costs.
4
Under some conditions, providers can provide publicly financed nursing‐home care in a private residential setting. These kinds of arrangements have been
increasing in recent years, but during our study period these did not play an important role.
5
These microdata are accessible for statistical and scientific research under certain conditions. For more information see: microdata@cbs.nl.
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The main advantages of our approach are its flexibility and the ability to use it on short
periods of panel data. It enables the modeling of the complex dynamics in LTC cost, together
with dynamics in income, wealth, and other relevant variables without having to impose many
restrictions on the functional form. Most existing studies use parametric approaches, such as
autoregressive models (De Nardi et al., 2010; French & Jones, 2004), Markov models (Ameriks
et al., 2011; Jones et al., 2018) or duration models (Fuino & Wagner, 2020). These models
require a variety of assumptions that cannot be justified on the basis of the data alone (Wong
et al., 2016).6 Also, when the time dynamics of multivariate outcomes have to be modeled
simultaneously, as is the case when microsimulation models are used to assess the economic
effects of population ageing (e.g., Boisclair et al., 2019; Goldman & Orszag, 2014), parametric
models tend to become increasingly complex. In contrast, the application of our approach to
modeling the lifecycle dynamics in different outcomes simultaneously is straightforward.7
The basic idea of the NNM algorithm is that we want to simulate N individual lifecycle
realizations of LTC spending. Each simulated lifecycle will consist of an age series
{ }Z Z Z Z= , , …,i
A
i a i a i a A, =0 , =1 , =
i
i
. Zi a, is a vector containing LTC spending and other variables of
interest (e.g., income and wealth) of individual i at age a. a = 0 denotes the starting age and Ai
is the age (index) of death. Our data are a relatively short panel containing observed values of
the variables of interest Yj a t, , for individuals j J= 1, …, over time periods t T= 1, …, .
The algorithm works as follows. Suppose we already have a simulated lifecycle path for an
individual up to age A: Z Z Z Z= { , , …, }i
A
i i i A,0 ,1 , . To extend this lifecycle path to age A + 1 we
consider all individuals in our data who have age A + 1 in period T . We pick the individual
whose life history over the last p age years Y Y{ , …, }j A p T p j A T, − +1, − , , −1 is most similar to
Z Z{ , …, }i A p i A, − +1 , . Note that, because we want to extend the lifecycle by one period, and the
time length of the panel is T , we can use a maximum age lag p of T − 1 years. When we have
picked an individual j, we use Yj A T, +1, as our simulated realization of ZA
i
+1. Then, to obtain a
realization for age A + 2 we can repeat the procedure using all individuals in the data with age
A + 2 at time T , matching on the life history over ages A p− + 2 to A p+ + 1. This proce-
dure is repeated until i is matched to an individual who dies in period T .
To initialize the algorithm, we use all individuals with age a = 0 at timeT . For these individuals
we have data onY overT − 1 ages before the starting age a = 0. We include the information on the
last p − 1 ages in the simulated lifecycle path, so we start with Z Z Z= { , }j p
i i0
− +1 0 .
To match a simulated lifecycle path to an observation from the data we use k‐nearest
neighbor matching. We measure the distance between two p‐long blocks z and y using a
distance measure d z y( , ). We use the Mahalanobis measure, which takes into account the
correlation between the components of y and differences in scale. One neighbor is randomly
drawn out of the k‐nearest neighbors.
We start at the age of 68. The data are stratified by sex, age, and home‐ownership, and
matched on income, net financial wealth (bank accounts, bonds, and stocks), housing wealth
(net value), and LTC expenditures. We simulate 10,000 paths each for women and men.
6
A recent study by Hurd et al. (2017), for out‐of‐pocket LTC spending in the United States shows the relevance of a flexible model. They compared their
semiparametric method, based on matching, to a more standard parametric Markov model. They found that their approach better fits the data and that the risk
(the chances of extreme use or costs) as estimated by their model is substantially greater than the risk as estimated by the parametric model. This, of course,
does not imply that a non‐ or semi‐parametric method will always outperform any parametric method. Instead, our point is that a model like ours can be
applied successfully in many settings because of its flexibility, whereas the performance of a particular parametric approach will often depend strongly on the
degree to which the assumptions can be justified based on the specific data characteristics.
7
This property of our method can also be of practical relevance to analyze joint insurance products, such as life‐care annuities (Brown & Warshawsky, 2013).
See Hussem et al. (2016) for a first step in that direction.
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To choose the number of neighbors k and the number of lags p used in the algorithm, we
perform an assessment study (described in Appendix B) where we compare the model fit across
different parameter settings (similar to Wong et al., 2016). For a group of individuals with
gender g and age a in 2009, we simulate the next 4 years of the life cycles (2010,…, 2013). We
can then compare how well the simulated data match the actual data over these 4 years. We
conclude that the setting with 10 neighbors (k = 10) and 1 lag for both the categorical and
continuous variables (p = 1) performs the best across the range of different ages and outcome
variables.
3.3 | Estimation results
3.3.1 | The lifetime distribution of LTC costs
Table 1 shows statistics of the estimated lifetime LTC costs. On average, a 70‐year‐old single
person uses almost 31,000 Euros of home care and 45,000 Euros of nursing‐home care over the
rest of his or her life. The costs are distributed very unevenly: 19% of the elderly do not use any
home care, while 5% use more than 138,000 Euros of home care. Almost half of the elderly
(48%) do not use any nursing‐home care, while the top 5% use 254,000 Euros or more of
TABLE 1 Descriptive statistics for lifetime LTC costs at age 70, for the whole population and by pension
wealth group 1 (lowest wealth) to 5 (highest)
Percentiles (conditional on use)
Group Mean SD % no use p25 p50 p75 p95
All Home care 30,828 54,443 19 725 8336 36,487 137,710
Nursing home 44,773 96,847 48 0 520 34,564 253,662
Total 75,601 115,108 13 2815 24,197 100,691 320,102
1 Home care 41,666 68,518 19 631 11,914 52,097 184,312
Nursing home 53,470 107,055 45 0 1647 50,741 282,133
Total 95,136 131,260 13 3667 39,399 134,608 378,229
2 Home care 36,128 62,571 20 609 9409 45,665 156,545
Nursing home 50,329 106,662 48 0 904 40,772 276,758
Total 86,457 127,007 14 3065 31,038 118,524 350,258
3 Home care 28,151 48,228 19 772 7924 34,437 125,686
Nursing home 47,533 101,113 47 0 994 38,608 261,889
Total 75,685 115,777 13 3017 23,133 97,968 321,145
4 Home care 22,966 40,352 19 723 6678 26,458 104,716
Nursing home 35,685 81,948 51 0 0 22,370 216,135
Total 58,651 94,347 14 2170 16,609 74,110 258,735
5 Home care 24,422 43,268 18 929 7845 28,541 108,673
Nursing home 35,972 81,358 51 0 0 25,914 216,918
Total 60,394 95,849 13 2587 18,909 76,217 263,390
Note: Pension wealth groups are quintiles of total lifetime wealth (initial wealth and present value of pension income), see
Section 3.3.2. All amounts are discounted using a discount factor of 1.5% (see Table 3).
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nursing‐home care. Thirteen percent of the elderly use neither home care nor nursing‐home
care, while the 5% of the elderly that use the most LTC overall, have total LTC costs of 320,000
Euros or higher.
Figure 1 shows the average spending by age. Until the age of 80, this amount is limited to
2500 Euros annually for both home and nursing‐home care. For home care, the average costs
rise gradually to 5000 Euros at the age of 95. The increase for nursing‐home care is much
steeper, and average cost go up to about 17,000 Euros at the highest ages.
3.3.2 | Distribution of LTC use across pension wealth groups
Our estimates contain income and financial wealth trajectories for each lifecycle path. To
simplify both the analysis and the interpretation, we group all lifecycle paths in financial
wealth deciles and income quintiles. We assign a fixed income stream (y) to each individual
lifecycle path, equal to average net income8 at age 70 within his income group, and initial
financial wealth at age 70, equal to average financial wealth at 70 within his wealth group. This
means every lifecycle path has initial financial wealth equal to 1 of 10 wealth amounts at age 70
and an income at every age equal to one of the five income levels defined.
In our presentation of the results, we focus on the distribution of LTC costs across pension
wealth groups. Pension wealth is the total lifetime wealth an older person has at his disposal, so
both his financial wealth and his fixed pension income. We define pension wealth as the sum of
the expected9 present value of the net income stream over the rest of life and initial financial
wealth at age 70. We group individuals in five pension wealth quintiles and show average
results for each group. In Appendix E, we also show results for specific combinations of fixed
pension income and initial financial wealth.
The top part of Figure 2 shows lifetime income and initial financial wealth across pension‐
wealth quintiles. The figure shows that higher pension wealth quintiles have, naturally, both
FIGURE 1 Average costs by age
8
We transform the gross income in our data into net income using the average tax burden by income bracket for older single households in 2013. These are
taken from the tax model used by CPB, see Koot et al. (2016).
9
The expectations are equal to the average per income and gender group.
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more remaining lifetime income and higher initial financial wealth at the age of 70. For most
elderly, financial wealth at age 70 is quite low.10
The bottom part of Figure 2 shows the life expectancy, and expected number of years with
use of home care and nursing‐home care, for each pension wealth group. Despite a lower life
expectancy, the elderly with the least financial means spend more life years, on average, in
need of home care and nursing‐home care. This also results in the highest expected LTC costs
for these groups. Although our data does not provide direct insight into why individuals with
(a)
(b)
FIGURE 2 Descriptive statistics for each pension wealth group, at age 70. (a) Expected LTC costs, expected
lifetime income, initial financial wealth; (b) expected lifeyears (with LTC use). Pension wealth groups are
quintiles of total lifetime wealth (initial wealth and present value of pension income), see Section 3.3.2. All
amounts are discounted using a discount factor of 1.5% (see Table 3). LTC, long‐term care
10
One reason for this is that we only look at singles. Elderly couples tend to have more wealth than singles. See Hussem et al. (2017) and statline.cbs.nl
8 | WOUTERSE ET AL.
limited financial means uses more LTC than individuals with high financial means, an im-
portant explanation seems to be differences in health: lower incomes, on average, spent con-
siderably more years of their life with disabilities than high incomes.11 Additionally, conditional
on health individuals with low incomes seem to use more formal care than individuals with
high incomes (Tenand et al., 2020). High‐income individuals seem to be better able to adapt
their living situation to their disabilities without using formal LTC, for instance because they
live in more accessible houses (Diepstraten et al., 2020).
The statistics of the estimated lifetime LTC costs across total wealth groups are also shown
in Table 1. TThe total LTC costs for the quintile with the lowest total wealth are 95,136 Euros
on average. For the highest quintile, this is 60,394 Euros. Groups with low financial wealth do
not have a higher probability of using any LTC. The difference in costs is thus driven by the
intensity of use:12 within the lowest wealth quintile, the 5% users with the highest cost spend
378,229 Euros of LTC or more. For the highest‐wealth quintile, this is 263,390 Euros or more.
4 | A MODEL OF LIFECYCLE CONSUMPTION AFTER
RETIREMENT
4.1 | The model
We implement a standard lifecycle model with forward‐looking individuals to model con-
sumption and saving behavior under uncertainty about mortality and LTC costs. Consumption
and saving behavior, conditional on initial financial wealth, are endogenous. LTC costs and
mortality, based on the estimated lifecycle paths, are exogenous. The estimated lifecycle paths
provide a semiparametric distribution function of LTC costs and mortality: all paths for in-
dividuals with the same initial characteristics at 70 are random draws from the same stochastic
process. This means that we can use a simulation‐based technique to calculate the expected
values that individuals need to maximize their expected lifetime utility. We explain this
technique more in Section 4.2. First, we discuss the setup of the lifecycle model.
4.1.1 | The baseline model
We model consumption and savings decisions of individuals after retirement. An individual
starts at the pension age, a = 0, with initial wealth W0. He receives an annual fixed pension
income y.13 He uses his annual income and initial wealth to finance consumption over a finite
number of time periods a A0, 1, …, *∈ . At each age a an individual does not know his age of
death Ai (with A A*i ≤ ) and his LTC co‐payments at higher ages, but he does know the full
11
See the data on healthy life expectancies (2014–2017) available at statline.cbs.nl. At age 65, the expected number of life years with disability is 10.9 years for
women in the lowest income quintile and 6.5 years for women in the highest quintile. For trends in quality‐adjusted life years across education groups that
show a similar pattern, see Gheorghe et al. (2016).
12
Differences on average discounted costs across income groups are also partly explained by differences in timing. High total wealth groups live longer, and
thus, on average, use LTC at higher ages than low groups. Differences in timing explain about 10% of the total difference in discounted costs: using a discount
rate of 1.5%, the lowest wealth group has average costs that are 40% higher than for the highest wealth group, without discounting this is 37%.
13
We do not endogenize the annuitization decision, but take the amount of initial wealth that is annuitized as given, which is in accordance with the current
Dutch pension system. (see Section 4.3). However, the model can easily be extended to include endogenous annuitziation of initial wealth, see Peijnenburg
et al. (2017).
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probability distribution of these things based on the realizations of the state variables Zi
a (including
LTC payments) up to age a. An individual derives utility from annual consumption (u c( )a ), which
might depend on health, and from leaving a bequest at the age of death (b w( )Ai ). The individual
wants to maximize his expected utility over his remaining lifetime. With a time‐separable utility
function, the value function that the individual needs to maximize at each age a is:
































with ps the probability of surviving period s, and β the discount factor.
In each age‐period, the individual has to choose the amount of his wealthWa and income y
he wants to consume now (ca), and the amount he wants to save for later. The individual is also
faced with co‐payments for LTC costs ha. He faces the following annual budget constraint:
c h r W W y+ + (1 + ) = + .a a a a
−1
+1 (2)
Wealth grows with the risk‐free interest rate r . The timing is such that an individual first
receives his income y, then ha has to be paid, and then he decides how much of his remaining
resources he consumes now (ca) and how much he saves for the next period r W((1 + ) )a−1 +1 .
We treat the level of co‐payments, ha, as given: the individual does not weight utility gained
from LTC use against utility from ca, but instead ha is an exogenous shock.










In our baseline model, u c( )a does not depend on health. In a number of sensitivity analyses we
let u c( )a depend on health (see below).
We also include a bequest motive. Individuals derive utility from the wealth wa they leave
when they die at age a. A bequest motive tends to decrease the welfare costs of co‐payments, as
it reduces the opportunity cost of precautionary saving (Lockwood, 2018). Even at very old ages,
individuals have to hold on to part of their lifetime wealth, because they always face the risk of
having to pay substantial amounts of out‐of‐pocket costs for LTC. This means that many
individuals, for whom the potential risk of LTC costs never materializes, die with a substantial
amount of wealth left. When individuals have a bequest motive, the wealth left behind is still of
value, in the sense that it adds to lifetime utility.
Following Kopczuk and Lupton (2007) we use a linear specification for the bequest motive:
b w θw( ) = .A Ai i (4)
This specification gives an intuitive notion of bequests as a luxury good: as wealth increases,
the marginal utility from bequests increases relative to the marginal utility of consumption.
At the same time, less‐wealthy individuals also derive (some) utility from leaving wealth at the
moment of premature death.
We impose a consumption floor, so that annual consumption cannot drop below
10,000 Euros.
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4.1.2 | Co‐payments
The level of the LTC co‐payment depends on the amount of LTC an individual needs and on the
co‐payment rules. We use a general co‐payment rule that simulates the Dutch system, where co‐
payments depend on income and wealth, but also other systems, such as a flat‐rate co‐payment
independent of spending power. Let Ha be the total costs of LTC an individual uses at age a. This
total level of LTC use is exogenous. We use the following general co‐payment rule:
h τH ν y
ν
ν














The government sets the parameters τ ν ν δ, , ,y w , and μ. The parameter τ determines what share of
total health care spending has to be paid by the individual. The parameters νy and νw are the
maximum shares of income and wealth that have to be spent on co‐payments. The parameter δ is a
fixed amount of income exempted from the co‐payments. The government can also set an overall
maximum μ on annual co‐payments on top of the income‐ and wealth‐dependent maximum.
The way the government sets the co‐payment rules affects the optimization problem of the
individuals. When ν > 0w , co‐payments are no longer fully exogenous since they depend on the
annual savings chosen by the individual.
4.1.3 | Health state‐dependent utility of consumption
The utility an individual derives from nonhealth care consumption could depend on his health
status (disability). Finkelstein et al. (2013) find that an increase in the number of chronic diseases
has a significant negative impact in the marginal utility of consumption. A priori, however, the
effect of poor health could go both ways: individuals might derive less utility from things like eating
out or recreation, but at the same time demand for things like domestic help, wheelchairs, and
stairlifts might increase (Meyer & Mok, 2009). Indeed, as pointed out by Peijnenburg et al. (2017),
there is no consensus in the empirical literature on the size and even the sign of the effect.
As we do not observe health directly, we use the fact that someone uses nursing‐home care
as a proxy. We only consider the use of nursing‐home care as an indicator of severe disability
and not the use of home care. A negative effect on the marginal utility of consumption is more
likely for nursing‐home care users, as this type of care is relatively comprehensive and
encompasses most additional consumption needs related to disability (housing and cleaning).
To include state‐dependent utility, we use the following commonly used adaptation of the
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The variable Δa is a dummy indicator for poor health, which we define as an individual having
any nursing home care at age a. The parameter κ determines the relative change in the
marginal utility of consumption in poor health (Δ = 1a ) compared to good health (Δ = 0a ).
When κ < 0, marginal utility is lower in poor health. When κ = 0, marginal utility is equal in
both health states. The parameter ξ determines the curvature of the utility function in poor
health. At the same time, ξ can be given a practical interpretation in the Dutch context. Nursing
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homes also cover part of the basic costs of living of their inhabitants (e.g., meals). The para-
meter can thus be used to model the level of these costs.
4.1.4 | Outcome
To assess the welfare of the pension wealth groups across co‐payment variants, we use the certainty
equivalent consumption (CEC) at age 70 (a = 0). TheCEC is the certain annual consumption level
that gives the same expected lifetime utility as the uncertain actual consumption (that depends on


































More specifically, we will calculate the averages of this measureCECg v, for each pension wealth
quintile g = 1, …, 5 across policy variants v.
To compare the welfare effects of the different co‐payment systems, we show the change in
CEC when going from the current system (v = 1) to one of the two alternatives (v = 2, 3) for
each group: CEC CEC−g v g, ,1. We can decompose the change in CEC into two elements:
CEC CEC h h CEC CEC h h− = ˆ − ˆ + ( − ) − ( ˆ − ˆ ).g v g g g v g v g g g v, ,1 ,1 ,
Changeinaveragepayment
, ,1 ,1 ,
Changeinriskpremium
⏟ ⏟ (8)
The first element in this equation measures the change in the average annual co‐payment14 a
member of group g can expect when the current system is replaced by variant v. This is the “pure”
distribution effect, reflecting the extent to which a variant shifts average payments from one group
to another. The second element measures the rest of the welfare effect due to changes in risk and a
different allocation of lifetime resources. We call this element the “risk premium” as it is equal to
the maximum additional annual amount, on top of the average payment, an individual would be
willing to pay to stay in the current system instead of going to alternative v.
We show the impact of the alternative co‐payment systems by plotting the change in
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4.2 | Numerical approach
The individual's maximization problem can be solved using dynamic programming. The life-
cycle optimization problem is divided into smaller yearly optimization problems. The algorithm
starts at the highest possible age‐period A*, and is then solved backwards recursively. We solve
14 ( )
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this problem using the approach developed by Koijen et al. (2010), that has been applied to LTC
financing in the United States by Peijnenburg et al. (2017). The approach combines the method
of endogenous gridpoints (Carroll, 2006) with a simulation based approximation of the ex-
pected values (Brandt et al., 2005). The approach is well suited to use in combination with the
semiparametric estimation of the lifecycle paths. Most approaches approximate the stochastic
processes (mortality, LTC costs) by a limited number of discrete states. However, the method of
Koijen et al. (2010) allows us to directly use the lifecycle paths as inputs. Appendix C provides a
detailed overview of the numerical procedure.
4.3 | Implementation
We use the lifecycle paths and the lifecycle model to assess the average payments and the
welfare effects of the Dutch income‐ and wealth‐dependent co‐payment system across income
and wealth groups. To do so, we compare the current system to two alternatives.
4.3.1 | Policy variants
In the Dutch system, users of LTC pay a co‐payment that depends on income and wealth. This
basically works as an annual deductible: each year, users of care pay all costs out‐of‐pocket
until they reach a maximum amount which depends on the users income and wealth. We
emulate the Dutch co‐payment scheme in 2013 using the formula in Equation (5). In this
scheme, 75% of income and 11% of financial wealth is included in the maximum co‐payment
for nursing home care and 15% of income and 2% of financial wealth for home care. Housing
wealth is not taken into account. In addition, the first 4500 Euros of income for nursing‐home
care and 16,600 Euros for home care are exempted. An overall maximum annual co‐payment of
27,000 Euros applies, regardless of income and wealth.15
Figure 3 shows the annual co‐payment for nursing‐home care at different levels of use
across individuals with different income and wealth. At low levels of use, all individuals pay the
same co‐payment. However, individuals with low income and wealth reach their maximum
annual co‐payment at much lower levels of use than an individual with a high income and
wealth: for an individual with an income of 16,000 Euros and no financial wealth, the max-
imum co‐payment is 7875 Euros (Figure 3a). For an individual with an income of 33,000 Euros
and 106,000 Euros of wealth, the maximum co‐payment is equal to the overall maximum of
27,000 Euros (Figure 3d).
To assess how the Dutch system affects costs and risk across groups, we introduce two
alternative co‐payment schemes for the counterfactual analysis. To make a fair comparison, we
set the parameters of these alternatives in such a way that they raise an equal amount of
aggregated revenues as the current system. The first alternative is an income‐dependent
15
In practice, the calculation of the co‐payments is more complex than in our stylized model. First, in case of nursing home care, a “low” co‐payment applies
over the first half year of LTC use, which is more or less 12.5% of gross income. Second, users of nursing home care pay a 100% of income over the first few
thousand Euros above the deductible. To keep the modeling exercises and the distributional effects it generates easily interpretable we have not included these
two details. Their inclusion leads to very similar results (see Wouterse et al., 2020). Third, the way wealth is treated in the home care co‐payment is different
from the nursing home co‐payment. In the case of home care, 12% of wealth is added to the income definition, and 15% of this is the co‐payment (thus we set
ν = 0.15 × 0.12 = 0.02w ). In case of nursing home care, 4% of wealth is included in the income definition and 8% is added to the co‐payment directly (thus we
set ν = 0.75 × 0.04 + 0.08 = 0.11w ).
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co‐payment: maximum co‐payments are a share νy of income, but do not depend on an
individual's wealth. We leave the other elements of the current system (the income exemptions
and the overall maximum co‐payment of 27,000 Euros) intact. As the total revenues of
the system are set to be the same, νy is higher than in the current system. This variant resembles
the co‐payment scheme in place before 2013. During the 2017 Dutch election campaign, some
Dutch political parties proposed to return to a co‐payment system only depending on income
(CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis, 2017).
Figure 3 shows the impact of this alternative scheme on the co‐payment across individuals
with different income and wealth. Individuals with a low pension income and a lot of financial
wealth (Figure 3b) benefit the most, while individuals with a high pension income and little
financial wealth are confronted with the highest increases in the maximum co‐payment
(Figure 3c). Individuals with high incomes and high wealth are less or not affected by the
change in co‐payment regime: their income is so high that they (almost) reach the overall
maximum of 27,000 Euros in both regimes (Figure 3d).
The second alternative is a flat‐rate co‐payment: co‐payments are a fixed percentage τ of an
individual's annual LTC costs, independent of income and wealth. Again, the other parts of the
system are left intact. Figure 3 also shows the effects of this system. The flat‐rate is less than
one, which means that at low amounts of LTC use, co‐payments are lower than in the current
system. As the annual co‐payments are no longer capped at an income‐ and wealth‐dependent
maximum, at high amounts of LTC use co‐payments will be higher for most individuals.
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
FIGURE 3 The design of the current co‐payment scheme and the two alternatives. The relationship
between total annual LTC costs and annual co‐payments for individuals with different levels of income and
wealth. (a) Low income (16,000) and no wealth (0); (b) low income (16,000) and high wealth (106,000); (c) high
income (33,000) and no wealth (0); (d) high income (33,000) and high wealth (106,000). LTC, long‐term care
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As shown in the figure, the flat‐rate will increase co‐payments the most for LTC users who use
a lot of care in 1 year and have moderate financial means (the right‐hand sides of
Figures 3a–c).16 Individuals with very high financial means benefit the most: even at high levels
of use, the flat‐rate co‐payment does not exceed the maximum co‐payment payable under the
current regime (Figure 3d).
The policy parameters for the current system and the two alternatives are shown in
Table 2.17 In the two alternative systems, we retain the current maximum co‐payment level of
27,000 Euros. In all cases, co‐payments do no exceed the actual LTC costs. The consumption
floor, set at 10,000 Euros, also restricts the annual co‐payments.18
4.3.2 | Other parameters
The other parameters are set in line with the literature. See Table 3. In the main specification
we include a bequest motive by setting θ = 50, 000γ−1∕ . This is in line with the range of values
estimated by Kopczuk and Lupton (2007), and means that above 50,000 Euros the marginal
utility of leaving a bequest is higher than the annual marginal utility of consumption. We set
the risk aversion parameter γ to 3. In the main specification, the utility from consumption does
not depend on health.
We perform six sensitivity analyses. In the first, we do not include a bequest motive. In the
second, we set θ = 40, 000γ−1∕ , which means that the bequest motive becomes more important. In
the third and fourth, we set a higher (γ = 5), respectively lower (γ = 2) risk aversion. In the fifth,
we introduce health state‐dependent utility of consumption. We set κ = 0.2 which means that the
marginal utility of consumption is 20% lower for individuals living in a nursing home than for
others. De Nardi et al. (2010) chose a similar value for κ and it seems to be at the more extreme side
of the range of values found by Finkelstein et al. (2013). In the last analysis, we set ξ =5000. This
means that the utility of consumption for nursing home users shifts to the right by 5000 Euros.19
4.4 | Match between the lifecycle wealth data and the model
As we are interested in the effects of LTC co‐payments across different wealth groups, the ability of
the lifecycle model to match the distribution of wealth in the actual population is of particular
interest. The semiparametric method we use to estimate the source data for the model has an
additional advantage here. We have included financial wealth as one of the matching variables in
the nearest‐neighbor algorithm. This means that we can directly compare the distribution of wealth
generated by the lifecycle model to the wealth data in our lifecycle paths.
16
As we discuss more extensively further on, the middle income groups lose the most. The first 4500 Euros of income are exempted from the co‐payment. As
individuals with a low income have relatively little income above this threshold, this means that even in case of the flat‐rate their co‐payment is effectively
capped at a relatively low level (see Figures 3a). Individuals with moderate incomes do not benefit from this implicit protection.
17
For home care, co‐payments are not based on costs (tariffs) but on a (lower) fixed hourly amount. We only observe total annual costs in the lifecycle data.
Therefore, we set the share of costs paid by the user (τ ) to 26% for the current system and the income‐dependent co‐payment variant. This 26% is the fixed
hourly amount divided by the average hourly tariff.
18
The consumption floor serves to prevent an individual's utility from dropping below a certain level, which is necessary for computational reasons but also
seems reasonable from a practical standpoint. An alternative approach is to not include a consumption floor (the deductible for nursing homes of 4500 Euros
that basically functions as the consumption floor) but shift the utility function for individuals living in a nursing home, motivated by the fact that the nursing
home takes over some of the costs of living. We use this approach as a sensitivity analysis.
19
In this case, we lower the consumption floor to the level of the deductible for nursing‐home care.
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In Figure 4 we show the cumulative distribution of financial wealth, in the lifecycle data
and as generated by the model in the main specification, across all ages. Each age for each
individual (if alive) is one observation here, so we basically treat our lifecycle data as one cross‐
section. The lifecycle model seems to fit this overall distribution of wealth in the data quite
well. The model slightly undersamples low levels of wealth (up to 60,000 Euros) and slightly
oversamples observations in the range between 100,000 and 150,000 Euros. In Appendix D we
assess how well the lifecycle model matches the age profiles of wealth for individuals with
specific combinations of initial financial wealth and income. The model seems to match the
lifecycle profiles of wealth well for most of these groups. However, it somewhat underestimates
financial wealth at high ages for low‐income groups.
5 | RESULTS
5.1 | Results for the main specification
Table 4 shows the certainty equivalent consumption (CEC) in the current co‐payment system.
It also shows on the things on which lifetime wealth is spent: average annual consumption,
LTC payments, and annualized bequests (the amount of lifetime wealth at death). The results
TABLE 2 Policy parameters in each variant, for the main specification
Variant τ νy νw δ μ
1 Inc and wealth dep. Nursing home 1 0.75 0.11 4,500 27,000
1 Inc and wealth dep. Home care 0.26 0.15 0.02 16,500 27,000
2 Inc dep. Nursing home 1 0.89 0 4,500 27,000
2 Inc dep. Home care 0.26 0.18 0 16,500 27,000
3 Flat‐rate Nursing home 0.37 0 0 4,500 27,000
3 Flat‐rate Home care 0.17 0 0 16,500 27,000
Note: The co‐payment rule (Equation 5) is: ( )h τH ν y W δ μ= min[ , min + − , 0 , ]a a y νν awy .
TABLE 3 Values of parameters in different specifications
r β γ ⁄θ γ−1 ξ κ
Main specification 1.015 0.985 3 50,000 0 0
No bequests 1.015 0.985 3 – 0 0
Lower bequest level 1.015 0.985 3 40,000 0 0
Higher risk aversion 1.015 0.985 5 50,000 0 0
Lower risk aversion 1.015 0.985 2 50,000 0 0
State dep. utility 1.015 0.985 3 50,000 0 −0.2
Lower costs in a nursing home 1.015 0.985 3 50,000 5000 0
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FIGURE 4 Cumulative distribution of financial wealth: lifecycle paths (reall) versus model (simulation)
TABLE 4 Certainty equivalent and average annual consumption, annual LTC payments and annualized
bequests by pension wealth group (1–5)
1 2 3 4 5
1 Inc and wealth dep., in levels
CEC 13,369 15,553 18,693 24,258 40,164
Consumption 13,650 16,070 19,446 25,095 37,482
LTC 617 1002 1206 1278 1626
Bequest 25 206 690 1451 5387
2 Inc dep., change compared to 1
CEC −49 −218 −326 −362 77
Consumption −52 −249 −428 −483 −213
LTC 27 68 48 0 −150
Bequest 12 215 417 494 364
3 Flat‐rate, change compared to 1
CEC −313 −574 −802 −420 156
Consumption −252 −600 −914 −575 −495
LTC 222 229 138 −98 −445
Bequest 10 374 697 519 754
Note: In the current system (1) and the two alternatives. Pension wealth groups (1 is lowest and 5 is highest) are quintiles of
total lifetime wealth (initial wealth and present value of pension income), see Section 3.3.2.
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are shown for each pension wealth group (see Section 3.3.2). There are considerable differences
in CEC across pension wealth groups. The group with the lowest financial means has a CEC of
13,369 Euros, while the highest has 40,164 Euros. LTC payments also vary considerably across
pension wealth groups. The current co‐payment system leads to a significant redistribution of
income from high to low groups: although the highest pension wealth group uses 37% less LTC
than the lowest (see Table 1), its average payments are 2.6 times as high (1626 Euros vs. 617).
To assess the effect of the current co‐payment system on the CEC across pension wealth
groups, we compare it to the two alternatives: a co‐payment based solely on income, and a flat‐
rate co‐payment independent of financial means. Table 4 shows how going from the current
system (v = 1) to one of the two alternatives (v = 2, 3) affects the CEC of each group g:
(CEC CEC−g v g, ,1). In Figure 5, this change is expressed as a percentage of current welfare, and
(a)
(b)
FIGURE 5 The change in total welfare (average co‐payment + risk premium), from going from the
current co‐payment system to one of the alternatives for each pension wealth group (a) Income‐dependent
co‐payment; (b) flat‐rate co‐payment. Pension wealth groups are quintiles of total lifetime wealth
(initial wealth and present value of pension income), see Section 3.3.2. The change in welfare in going
from the current system (v = 1) to alternative system v, see Equation (9)
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decomposed into the change in the average payment and the change in the risk premium, as in
Equation (9).
That the current system redistributes relatively strongly from high to low pension wealth
groups becomes clear when we consider the average payments in the other two alternatives.
The alternatives raise the same overall revenue, which means that the change on average
payments is purely a redistribution of the burden across the groups (the change in payments
across groups adds up to zero20). An income‐dependent co‐payment would lead to a decrease
on average payments for the highest pension wealth group, and an increase for the others,
especially the second and third group. A flat‐rate co‐payment would lead to a decrease on
average payments for both the highest and second highest pension wealth group.
Compared to the alternatives, the current co‐payment system offers more protection against
risk to low‐ and especially middle pension wealth groups. Table 5 shows the distribution of
discounted lifetime co‐payments in the three variants, for the lowest, middle, and highest
pension wealth group. For both the lowest and the middle groups, going to an income‐
dependent or flat‐rate co‐payment would increase payments, especially for individuals using a
lot of care (the right‐hand tail of the distribution). The increases in payments for heavy users of
LTC are most substantial in the case of the flat‐rate. In contrast to the low and middle group,
heavy users of LTC in the highest pension wealth group would actually be confronted with
lower payments. This indicates that the current system puts a relatively strong burden on the
intensive users of care with high financial means.
The effects on risk are reflected by the effects on the risk premium. Although the two
alternatives raise the same overall revenue, all pension wealth groups, with the exception of the
highest, are better of in the current system due to the increased risk. In particular the welfare
loss of increased risk associated with going from the current system to a flat‐rate is substantial.
The low and middle groups loose between 0.7% and 3.6% of their current CEC due to the
increase in risk (Figure 5). Interestingly, in terms of risk, it is not the lowest pension wealth
group that would be most affected by the introduction of a flat‐rate, but the middle groups
TABLE 5 Distribution of lifetime co‐payments, by pension wealth group (1, 3, and 5)
Group Variant p25 p50 p75 p95
1 1 Inc and wealth dep. 872 4474 11,071 28,586
2 Inc dep. 887 4774 11,691 29,751
3 Flat‐rate 730 6289 16,559 37,056
3 1 Inc and wealth dep. 915 7386 23,299 66,574
2 Inc dep. 915 7237 23,596 70,578
3 Flat‐rate 558 4977 25,238 81,855
5 1 Inc and wealth dep. 776 6499 29,073 108,475
2 Inc dep. 769 6162 26,138 97,171
3 Flat‐rate 477 3979 18,566 87,111
Note: In the current system (1) and the two alternatives. Pension wealth groups (1 is lowest and 5 is highest) are quintiles of
total lifetime wealth (initial wealth and present value of pension income), see Section 3.3.2. All amount are discounted to
age 70.
20
The numbers in the table do not exactly add up to zero, because of the numerical approximation.
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(quintiles 2 and 3). The income of members of quintile 1 is relatively close to the consumption
floor. This means that even if the co‐payment does not depend on income and wealth, their
additional net payments are relatively limited. The middle groups hardly benefit from the
consumption floor and thus face a larger risk of having to pay considerable co‐payments.
The protection offered by the current system comes at the expense of the highest
pension wealth group: they would have a higher CEC in an income‐dependent system than
in the current system. Counter intuitively, in the case of the flat‐rate co‐payment, the CEC
of the highest pension wealth group would only be (slightly) higher than it is now.
However, these results mask the benefits for individuals with very high financial wealth, as
there is heterogeneity in income and financial wealth within the groups.21 The results for
specific combinations of income and financial wealth in Appendix E show that elderly
with very high financial wealth would have a higher CEC in the case of a flat‐rate
co‐payment.
The different co‐payment schemes affect saving behavior as well. This can be seen by
comparing the bequests across policy variants (Table 4). The amounts shown here are the
(discounted) annualized averages. By comparing this to the annual consumption and pay-
ments, we can see what share of lifetime pension wealth is, on average, left at death. In both the
income‐dependent system and the flat‐rate bequests increase for all groups with the increase
more substantial for the flat‐rate.22
5.2 | Sensitivity analysis
As described in Section 4.3.2, we run six sensitivity tests using different parameterizations.
When we change the parameters of the utility function, this also affects the revenues raised in
the current co‐payment system. In the absence of a bequest motive, for instance, individuals
will save less, which reduces the revenues raised through the wealth‐dependent part of the co‐
payment. To make a fair comparison across the co‐payment systems within each sensitivity
analysis, we keep the policy parameters of the current system fixed (at the level in Table 2), but
we adjust the policy parameters of the alternatives so that they each raise an equal amount of
revenue as the current system.







when going from the current system to an income‐dependent or flat‐rate co‐payment by
pension wealth group for the main specification and for the sensitivity analyses (this is
equal to what is shown in Figure 5 for the main specification). In general, the results for all
pension wealth groups, except the highest, are quite similar across different parameter
settings. Going from the current system to one of the two alternatives leads to a welfare loss.
This loss is largest for the middle‐income groups, and is most substantial in the case of the
flat‐rate alternative. There are some differences in the magnitude of the effects compared to
the main specification though.
21
Table 5 shows that the risk (of very high costs) is lower in the flat‐rate system than in the current system for the highest pension wealth group. This suggests
that the welfare loss is due to a shift in payments from more to less wealthy individuals within the highest pension wealth group.
22
The co‐payment system affects the bequests in three ways: First, when an individual pays a co‐payment this lowers his financial wealth directly. Second, in
response to a higher risk of co‐payments, individuals increase their savings, which increases average wealth at death. Third, when wealth is taxed (as in the
current system) this has a negative effect on savings.
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As the different parameterizations also affect the outcomes in the current system, identi-
fying the mechanisms underlying these differences in magnitude is not always straightforward.
The exclusion of the bequest motive does not seem to affect the outcomes of the low and middle
groups very strongly. A higher risk aversion leads to higher losses in welfare, especially when
going to a flat‐rate co‐payment, and a lower risk aversion to lower losses. The effects of health‐
state dependent utility and lower costs of living in a nursing home are quite heterogeneous,
although they seem to lead to less welfare loss for the middle groups when going from the
current to a solely income‐dependent system.
For the highest pension wealth group, results vary more. In the main specification, the
highest pension wealth group would gain from going from the current system to a solely
income‐dependent co‐payment. In the “no bequest” and “higher risk aversion” settings, the
group would have a slight loss. In all settings, the highest group benefits from going to a flat‐
rate co‐payment.23
TABLE 6 The change in welfare from going from the current system to one of the two alternatives, by
pension wealth group
Main specification
2 Inc dep. −0.36 −1.4 −1.75 −1.49 0.19
3 Flat‐rate −2.34 −3.7 −4.29 −1.73 0.39
No bequest motive
2 Inc dep. −0.33 −1.35 −1.7 −1.54 −0.12
3 Flat‐rate −2.27 −3.58 −4.24 −1.69 0.08
Lower bequest level
2 Inc dep. −0.38 −1.48 −1.85 −1.48 0.71
3 Flat‐rate −2.39 −3.81 −4.34 −1.78 2.34
Higher risk aversion
2 Inc dep. −1 −3.31 −3.51 −3.15 −0.06
3 Flat‐rate −3.77 −6.11 −6.3 −2.52 0.1
Lower risk aversion
2 Inc dep. −0.22 −0.67 −0.73 −0.85 0.18
3 Flat‐rate −2.18 −1.68 −2.41 −1.41 0.17
State dep. utility
2 Inc dep. −0.27 −0.99 −1.45 −1.41 0.18
3 Flat‐rate −2.45 −2.6 −3.9 −1.81 0.21
Lower costs of living in a nursing home
2 Inc dep. −0.29 −0.91 −0.94 −1.01 0.16
3 Flat‐rate −2.67 −4.16 −4.25 −1.71 0.61
Note: For different parameter specifications. Pension wealth groups (1 is lowest and 5 is highest) are quintiles of total lifetime
wealth (initial wealth and present value of pension income), see Section 3.3.2. The change in welfare in going from the current
system (v = 1) to alternative system v, for group g is measured as: CEC CEC CEC( − )g v g g, ,1 ,1∕ . The parameter values for each
specification can be found in Table 3.
23
In the sensitivity test where we let the bequest motive start at 30,000 Euros, the welfare gain for the highest group is very large. However, this setting would
lead to unrealistically high utility gained from bequest for the wealthiest group (lifetime utility for this group would be almost twice as high as in the main
specification).
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5.3 | Moral hazard and informal care
An important issue in the interpretation of the results is that we treat LTC use as exogenous. In
practice, however, LTC use is endogenous, in the sense that individuals might change their use
of care in response to a change in the out‐of‐pocket price. Full insurance of LTC costs leads to
moral hazard when individuals choose to use more care than what they would be willing to pay
for out‐of‐pocket. The presence of moral hazard is also the most important reason to introduce
co‐payments: they reduce inefficient use of care by increasing the marginal costs of care for the
user. Ideally, we would include the effects on moral hazard in the assessment of the different
co‐payment schemes. However, the empirical literature on the effects of co‐payments (or pri-
ces) on LTC use is still limited (Konetzka et al., 2014), and inconclusive (e.g., Grabowski &
Gruber, 2007; Konetzka et al., 2014; Li & Jensen, 2011; Lin & Imanaka, 2020).
In our analysis, we therefore abstract from the effects of co‐payments on use and moral
hazard by taking the desire of the government to finance a certain share of macroexpenditures
out‐of‐pocket24 and focusing on how different co‐payment schemes shift the financial burden
across groups. To give some qualitative assessment of how the different schemes might impact
the use of care, we focus on three issues: the effect of the marginal price at different levels of
LTC use; the income elasticity of LTC demand; and, the effects of co‐payments on the use of
privately financed or informal care.
A relevant characteristic of the current Dutch system is that, at low levels of (annual) care use,
all users pay full costs out‐of‐pocket, while at higher levels of use (depending on income and
wealth) marginal out‐of‐pocket costs are zero (see Figure 3). Theoretically, co‐insurance rates
should be high in relatively good health states, in which elasticity of demand is high, and low or
zero in poor health states, in which elasticity of demand is low (Blomqvist, 1997; Drèze &
Schokkaert, 2013; Klimaviciute & Pestieau, 2020). This suggests that replacing the current system
by a flat‐rate co‐payment may induce additional welfare losses, as this would shift co‐payments
from individuals who use a little care (presumably the most healthy and thus price‐elastic
individuals) to individual who use a lot of care (the least healthy and least price elastic).25
A second important characteristic of the Dutch system is that, at higher levels of use,
co‐payments are higher for high than for low incomes. In standard lifecycle models that include
endogenous care use (e.g., De Nardi et al., 2010, 2016), higher incomes are implicitly assumed
to have a lower price sensitivity for care, as their marginal utility of consumption is lower than
for low incomes. In the case of public insurance, however, high income groups might, in fact,
be more price sensitive for public LTC, as they have more possibilities to substitute with private
care (see the following paragraph). In addition, the income and wealth‐dependence of the
current Dutch system ensures that the co‐payments are affordable to users with a low income
(when individuals abstain for care use not because they are not willing to pay the out‐of‐pocket
price, but because they cannot afford it, this is welfare decreasing, Nyman, 1999).
Formal public LTC can be partly substituted by either privately financed help26 or informal
care (Bonsang, 2009; Mommaerts, 2018). As discussed in Section 3.3, it seems that higher
24
Where a theoretical motivation for co‐payments sterns mostly from the presence of moral‐hazard, in (Dutch) policy discussions co‐payments are often
motivated by the intrinsic desire to shift part of the costs of public LTC to the users to contain public spending.
25
The same logic suggests that replacing the current system, which has a cap on annual co‐payments by a system with a cap on lifetime co‐payments might be
welfare improving (see Wouterse et al., 2020, for a suggestion in this direction).
26
There is not really a private market for formal care services in The Netherlands. However, individuals can of course hire a cleaner or a help in the household
or buy other services that partly substitute for formal care.
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incomes use these substitutes more often and this might partly explain why they use less
publicly financed LTC than low incomes (Figure 2). It is likely that the higher use of private
and informal care by higher incomes is due to their higher (financial) ability to do so. However,
if this substitution is partly induced by the co‐payments (higher incomes use more informal and
private care because they have to pay higher co‐payments for public care than low incomes),
then we underestimate the (financial) burden of the current system for high incomes. Similarly,
we then underestimate the (financial) gains for this group when going from the current system
to a flat‐rate co‐payment. At the same time, if the increased co‐payment for the low incomes in
the flat‐rate system would then induce these groups to use more private or informal care
(which probably comes at a higher costs for them than for the higher income groups), we are
also underestimating their financial burden in that case.
6 | DISCUSSION
We have estimated the longitudinal dynamics of LTC costs in The Netherlands, using the
semiparametric nearest‐neighbor approach. We have applied our longitudinal estimates of a
structural lifecycle model to evaluate the Dutch LTC financing system, in which co‐payments
are based on a fixed share of income and wealth. We have found that there is a strong income
and wealth gradient in the lifetime use of long‐term care. Compared to a flat‐rate or a solely
income‐dependent co‐payment raising the same revenue, the Dutch system redistributes the
costs of co‐payments from the elderly with the lowest financial means, who on average use the
most care, to the elderly with the highest means, who use the least care.
Moreover, the lifecycle model allows us to take the welfare effects of risk into account. It
turns out that the income and wealth dependency in the Dutch system protects not only the
elderly with the lowest financial means, but specifically those in the middle groups against
substantial financial risks: when going from the current system to a flat‐rate co‐payment these
groups would lose between 2.1% and 3.6% of their current welfare due to increased risk. Only
the elderly with very high pension wealth would benefit from a flat‐rate.
Our analysis underlines the point of McClellan and Skinner (2006) that including risk in the
analysis of distributional effects of care systems is important. Especially for the middle income and
wealth groups, the welfare losses induced by the two alternative co‐payment systems, compared to
the current system, are much larger than the change on average payments. The finding that the
protection against financial risk is even more important for the middle groups, as they actually have
something to loose, is similar to what De Nardi et al. (2016) found for higher‐income groups in
Medicaid. An important element in the Dutch system seems to be that, although co‐payments
depend on wealth, the elderly do not have to completely deplete their savings before gaining access
to public insurance. This means that the system protects the elderly with some income and wealth
better against costs than a fully means‐tested system (e.g., Brown & Finkelstein, 2007).
We have focused on the distributional effects of co‐payments during the retirement phase,
starting at age 70. Not modeling the working phase of life helps to keep the model tractable and
computationally manageable. This has enabled us to include a relatively large amount of detail,
both in the dynamics in LTC costs and the policy variants. However, not modeling the working
life phase means we might overestimate the welfare losses due to co‐payments, as individuals
might increase their savings before retirement as a precaution.
We also restricted the analysis to singles to keep the lifecycle model tractable. The effects for
couples will differ, as they can rely more on informal care and are able to share financial
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shocks. At the same time, it is mostly the longest‐surviving partner who will need formal LTC,
and for him or her the financial effects might actually be quite similar to those for single
households. An extension of the model to multiperson households would be an interesting
exercise for further research. Similarly, an empirical analysis on the effect of the design of the
co‐payment on use and moral hazard (see Section 5.3) would provide further valuable insights
to complete a full welfare assessment. In 2013, the Dutch government increased the wealth‐
dependent co‐payment which might offer another opportunity for future research (Non, 2017).
7 | CONCLUSION
Income and wealth dependent co‐payments provide more insurance value than flat‐rate co‐
payments that do not depend on the financial means of the LTC user. This is not only the case
for the elderly with low financial means, but especially for elderly in the middle‐income groups.
Elderly with modest financial means benefit from an income‐ and wealth‐dependent co‐
payment, compared to a flat‐rate co‐payment, not so much because of lower average payments
but mostly because they are exposed to less financial risk. Elderly with higher financial means
have to pay more on average, but only for the 20% of the elderly with the highest means does
this outweigh the costs of the additional risk that comes with the flat‐rate co‐payment. Unless
one expects that a flat‐rate co‐payment leads to substantially less distortions during the working
life, or substantially decreases moral hazard, the welfare case for an income‐ and wealth‐
dependent co‐payment seems strong.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This study was partly funded by the Netspar project “Optimal saving and insurance for old age:
The role of public long‐term care insurance.” We thank two anonymous reviewers, Casper van
Ewijk, Max Groneck, Neha Bairoliya, Rosella Levaggi, Jakob Everding, Joost Wammes, and
Rob Aalbers for comments on earlier versions of the paper. We also thank the participants of
the Netspar Pension Day, the Netspar Pension Workshop, ASHEcon, EUHEA, the Italian
Health Econometrics Workshop and the European Workshop on Health Econometrics. We
thank Michelle Galloway for help in copy editing the text.
REFERENCES
Ameriks, J., Briggs, J., Caplin, A., Shapiro, M. D., & Tonetti, C. (2020). Long‐term‐care utility and late‐in‐life
saving. Journal of Political Economy, 128(6), 2375–2451.
Ameriks, J., Caplin, A., Laufer, S., & Van Nieuwerburgh, S. (2011). The joy of giving or assisted living? Using
strategic surveys to separate public care aversion from bequest motives. The Journal of Finance, 66(2),
519–561.
Bakx, P., Wouterse, B., van Doorslaer, E., & Wong, A. (2020). Better off at home? Effects of nursing home
eligibility on costs, hospitalizations and survival. Journal of Health Economics, 73, 102354.
Blomqvist, Å. (1997). Optimal non‐linear health insurance. Journal of Health Economics, 16(3), 303–321.
Boisclair, D., Décarie, Y., Laliberté‐Auger, F., & Michaud, P.‐C. (2019). COMPAS: A health microsimulation
model for Quebec and Canada. Technical document, Chaire de recherche sur les enjeux économiques
intergénérationnels, Montréal.
Bonsang, E. (2009). Does informal care from children to their elderly parents substitute for formal care in
Europe? Journal of Health Economics, 28(1), 143–154.
Brandt, M. W., Goyal, A., Santa‐Clara, P., & Stroud, J. R. (2005). A simulation approach to dynamic portfolio choice
with an application to learning about return predictability. Review of Financial Studies, 18(3), 831–873.
24 | WOUTERSE ET AL.
Brown, J., & Warshawsky, M. (2013). The life care annuity: A new empirical examination of an insurance
innovation that addresses problems in the markets for life annuities and long‐term care insurance. Journal
of Risk and Insurance, 80(3), 677–704.
Brown, J. R., & Finkelstein, A. (2007). Why is the market for long‐term care insurance so small? Journal of
Public Economics, 91(10), 1967‐1991.
Brown, J. R., & Finkelstein, A. (2009). The private market for long‐term care insurance in the United States: A
review of the evidence. Journal of Risk and Insurance, 76(1), 5–29.
Carroll, C. D. (2006). The method of endogenous gridpoints for solving dynamic stochastic optimization
problems. Economics Letters, 91(3), 312–320.
Colombo, F., & Mercier, J. (2012). Help wanted? Fair and sustainable financing of long‐term care services. OECD
Health Policy Studies.
CPB. (2017). CPB Netherlands Bureau for economic policy analysis. Keuzes in kaart 2018–2021. CPB, The Hague.
De Nardi, M., French, E., & Jones, J. B. (2010). Why do the elderly save? The role of medical expenses. Journal of
Political Economy, 118(1), 39–75.
De Nardi, M., French, E., & Jones, J. B. (2016). Medicaid insurance in old age. American Economic Review,
106(11), 3480–3520.
Diepstraten, M., Douven, R., & Wouterse, B. (2020). Can your house keep you out of a nursing home? Health
Economics, 29(5), 540–553.
Drèze, J. H., & Schokkaert, E. (2013). Arrows theorem of the deductible: Moral hazard and stop‐loss in health
insurance. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 47(2), 147–163.
Farmer, J. D., & Sidorowich, J. J. (1987). Predicting chaotic time series. Physical Review Letters, 59(8), 845.
Finkelstein, A., Luttmer, E. F., & Notowidigdo, M. J. (2013). What good is wealth without health? The effect of health
on the marginal utility of consumption. Journal of the European Economic Association, 11(Suppl 1), 5221–258.
French, E., & Jones, J. B. (2004). On the distribution and dynamics of health care costs. Journal of Applied
Econometrics, 19(6), 705–721.
Fuino, M., & Wagner, J. (2020). Duration of long‐term care: Socio‐economic factors, type of care interactions and
evolution. Insurance: Mathematics and Economics, 90, 151–168.
Gheorghe, M., Wubulihasimu, P., Peters, F., Nusselder, W., & Van Baal, P. H. (2016). Health inequalities in The
Netherlands: Trends in quality‐adjusted life expectancy (QALE) by educational level. The European Journal
of Public Health, 26(5), 794–799.
Goldman, D. P., & Orszag, P. R. (2014). The growing gap in life expectancy: Using the future elderly model to
estimate implications for Social Security and Medicare. American Economic Review, 104(5), 230–233.
Grabowski, D. C., & Gruber, J. (2007). Moral hazard in nursing home use. Journal of Health Economics, 26(3), 560–577.
Hsieh, D. A. (1991). Chaos and nonlinear dynamics: Application to financial markets.The Journal of Finance,
46(5), 1839‐1877.
Hurd, M. D., Michaud, P. C., & Rohwedder, S. (2017). Distribution of lifetime nursing home use and of out of
pocket spending. PNAS, 114(37), 9838–9842.
Hussem, A., TerRele, H., & Wouterse, B. (2017). Inkomens‐en vermogensafhankelijke eigen bijdragen in de
langdurige ouderenzorg: Een levensloopperspectief (Design Paper 87). Netspar, Tilburg.
Hussem, A., Van Ewijk, C., TerRele, H., & Wong, A. (2016). The ability to pay for long‐term care in the
Netherlands: A life‐cycle perspective. De Economist, 164(2), 1–26.
Jones, J. B., De Nardi, M., French, E., McGee, R., & Kirschner, J. (2018). The lifetime medical spending of retirees
(Working Paper 24599). National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge.
Khwaja, A. (2010). Estimating willingness to pay for Medicare using a dynamic life‐cycle model of demand for
health insurance. Journal of Econometrics, 156(1), 130–147.
Klimaviciute, J., & Pestieau, P. (2020). Insurance with a deductible: A way out of the long term care insurance
puzzle. Journal of Economics, 130, 297–307.
Koijen, R. S., Nijman, T. E., & Werker, B. J. (2010). When can life cycle investors benefit from time‐varying bond
risk premia? Review of Financial Studies, 23(2), 741–780.
Konetzka, R. T., He, D., Guo, J., & Nyman, J. A. (2014). Moral hazard and long‐term care insurance. Health &
Healthcare in America: From Economics to Policy. Ashecon.
Koot, P., Vlekke, M., Berkhout, E., & Euwals, R. (2016). Mimosi: Microsimulatiemodel voor belastingen, sociale
zekerheid, loonkosten en koopkracht. CPB Background Document, The Hague.
WOUTERSE ET AL. | 25
Kopczuk, W., & Lupton, J. P. (2007). To leave or not to leave: The distribution of bequest motives. The Review of
Economic Studies, 74(1), 207–235.
Kopecky, K. A., & Koreshkova, T. (2014). The impact of medical and nursing home expenses on savings.
American Economic Journal Macroeconomics, 6(3), 29–72.
Li, Y., & Jensen, G. A. (2011). The impact of private long‐term care insurance on the use of long‐term care.
INQUIRY: The Journal of Health Care Organization, Provision, and Financing, 48(1), 34–50.
Lin, H.‐R., & Imanaka, Y. (2020). Effects of copayment in long‐term care insurance on long‐term care and
medical care expenditure. Journal of the American Medical Directors Association, 21(5), 640–646.
Lockwood, L. M. (2018). Incidental bequests and the choice to self‐insure late‐life risks. American Economic
Review, 108(9), 2513–2550.
McClellan, M., & Skinner, J. (2006). The incidence of medicare. Journal of Public Economics, 90(1), 257–276.
Meyer, B., & Mok, W. K. (2009). Disability, earnings, income and consumption (Working Paper 18869). National
Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge.
Mommaerts, C. (2018). Are coresidence and nursing homes substitutes? Evidence from Medicaid spend‐down
provisions. Journal of Health Economics, 59, 125–138.
Non, M. (2017). Co‐payments in long‐term home care: Do they affect the use of care? (CPB Discussion Paper 363).
CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis, The Hague.
Nyman, J. A. (1999). The value of health insurance: The access motive. Journal of Health Economics, 18(2), 141–152.
Palumbo, M. G. (1999). Uncertain medical expenses and precautionary saving near the end of the life cycle.The
Review of Economic Studies, 66(2), 395–421.
Peijnenburg, K., Nijman, T., & Werker, B. J. (2017). Health cost risk: A potential solution to the annuity puzzle.
The Economic Journal, 127(603), 1598–1625.
Sadiraj, K., Oudijk, D., van Kempen, H., & Stevens, J. (2011). De opmars van het pgb. De ontwikkeling van het
persoonsgebonden budget in nationaal en internationaal perspectief. Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau, The Hague.
Simmons, C., Leichsenring, K., Navarini, L., & Rodrigues, R. (2020). Co‐financing residential care for older
people: Models and equity implications (Policy Brief 2020/4). European Centre For Social Welfare Policy and
Research, Vienna.
Tenand, M., Bakx, P., & Van Doorslaer, E. (2020). Equal long‐term care for equal needs with universal and
comprehensive coverage? An assessment using dutch administrative data. Health Economics, 29(4), 435–451.
Van Ooijen, R., De Bresser, J., & Knoef, M. (2018). Health and household expenditures. (Design Paper 103).
Netspar, Tilburg.
Wong, A., Boshuizen, H., Polder, J., & Ferreira, J. A. (2016). Assessing the inequality of lifetime healthcare
expenditures: A nearest neighbour resampling approach. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society: Series A, 180(1),
141–160.
Wouterse, B., Hussem, A., & Aalbers, R. (2020). Betere risicospreiding van eigen bijdragen in de verpleeghuiszorg.
Policy brief, CPB, The Hague.
SUPPORTING INFORMATION
Additional Supporting Information may be found online in the supporting information tab for
this article.
How to cite this article: Wouterse B, Hussem A, Wong A. The risk protection and
redistribution effects of long‐term care co‐payments. J Risk Insur. 2021;1–26.
https://doi.org/10.1111/jori.12337
26 | WOUTERSE ET AL.
